































































































































































10	 Their	 stated	 aim	was	 to	 highlight	 how	 classic	 democratic	 ideals	 and	 theoretical	 conceptions	 of	












The	 normative	 assumptions	 of	 this	 model	 of	 ‘interest	 group	 liberalism’	 have	 been	 seriously	
challenged,	most	notably	in	the	work	of	Mancur	Olson	(1965),13	which	made	clear	that	unregulated	
group	 competition	 could	not	 lead	 to	an	automatic	democratic	 equilibrium,	 given	 the	 inequality	of	
resources	 of	 interest	 groups.	 The	 response,	 in	 public	 law,	 was	 to	 proceduralise	 processes	 of	
representation	 and	 bargaining,	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 interests	 would	 have	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 being	
heard	 and	 influencing	 outcomes.14	 The	 history	 of	 American	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law,	
and	especially	of	judge-made	public	law,	is	characterised	by	this	attempt	to	ensure	equal	access	to	
policy-making	 by	 building	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 transparency	 and	 ‘due	 process’	 (Shapiro	 1988:	 36;	
Stewart	1975;	Sunstein	1985;	Craig	1990:	56).	Both	legislatures	and	bureaucrats	are	required	to	take	
into	account	the	variety	of	concerned	 interests	 in	policy-making	 ,	and	are	subject	to	review	by	the	
judiciary	 for	 compliance	 with	 these	 requirements,	 though	 with	 considerably	 more	 rigour	 for	
																																								 																				
11	 It	 should,	 however,	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 in	 certain	 cases	 later	 ‘neo-corporatist	 authors’	 straw	
manned		the	pluralist	model,	making	it	easier	to	criticize	(Nedelmann	and	Meier1979:	94).		
12	 The	 only	 value	 transcending	 the	 private	 interests	 of	 groups	 is	 an	 assumed	 ‘community	 of	
purpose’―,	 a	 consensus	 about	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game,	 i.e.	 everybody	 accepts	 that	 interest-group	
competition	generates	the	‘general	interest’	(Lowi	1969:	294).	
13	 Olson	 (1965)	 pointed	 to	 problems	 such	 as	 ‘free-riding’:	 a	 common	 interest	 shared	 by	 a	 large	
aggregate	 of	 individuals	 will	 have	 difficulties	 influencing	 policy-making	 because	 people	 do	 not	
organise	when	 they	 think	 they	 profit	 from	 the	 action	 of	 others.	 Conversely,	 interests	 shared	 by	 a	
small	group	will	strongly	influence	government	because	of	the	greater	incentives	to	organise.	
14	Cohen	and	Rogers	(1995:	28)	therefore	talk	about	‘egalitarian	pluralism’.	
administrative	 than	 legislative	 decision-making	 (see	 Sunstein	 1985:	 65).15	 With	 respect	 to	
administrative	rule-making,	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA)	requires	a	notice	and	comment	
procedure	which	obliges	an	agency	to	give	notice	that	it	is	contemplating	a	rule,	receive	comments	
from	 interested	outsiders,	print	 its	 final	 rule	 in	 the	Federal	Register	and	accompany	 the	published	
rule	with	a	 concise	and	general	 statement	of	 its	basis	 and	purpose	 (Wagner	 this	 volume).	 For	 the	
adjudicative	 decisions	 of	 agencies,	 the	 APA	 provides	 for	 trial-like	 procedures.16	 The	way	 in	 which	
administrative	 law	 has	 intervened	 to	 ensure	 due	 process	 for	 individuals	 and	 groups	 is	 at	 once	 a	
departure	 and	 a	 continuation	of	 the	 initial	 pluralist	 idea	of	 interest	 group	 liberalism.	 	On	 the	one	
hand,	 it	requires	legal	 intervention	to	ensure	‘fair’	 interest	group	competition.	 	On	the	other	hand,	
the	focus	is	on	creating	formal	equality	in	the	legal	opportunity	to	participate,	leading	potentially	to	
an	imbalance	between	those	with	enough	resources	to	use	the	legal	channels	(repeatedly)	and	those	
without	such	resources	 (Wagner	 this	volume).	 	 	 	With	 its	emphasis	on	 formal	equality	 ,	 the	model	
stays	 loyal	 to	 its	 original	 underpinnings	 (and	 contrasts	 sharply	 with	 the	 neo-corporatist	 starting	
point),	 namely	 that	 the	 state	 should	 not	 actively	 intervene	 to	 facilitate	 the	 organization	 of	 civil	
society	or	to	create	representative	settings,	as	interest	group	competition	will	ensure	the	emergence	
of	the	public	interest	in	a	system	of	checks	and	balances.17		As	Bignami	(2011)	argues,	this	difference	
between	 the	 American	 pluralist	 model	 and	 the	 European	 neo-corporatist	 model	 links	 to	 broader	








(1988),	 Sunstein	 (1985)	 	 and	 Stewart	 (1975).	 This	 tendency	 reached	 its	 apogee	 in	 the	 early	 1980s	

























2.2.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 neo-corporatist	 tradition	 on	 the	 EU:	 institutionalisation	 without	
proceduralisation	
Moving	from	the	national	 level	to	the	EU,	the	European	neo-corporatist	 legacy	has	also	 influenced	
the	way	in	which	interest	group	participation	is	organised	within	EU	policy-making.	At	the	creation	of	


















in	1957.	 	All	 founding	Member	States,	except	Germany,22	had	economic	and	social	 councils	at	 the	
national	 level	 and	 favoured	 the	 creation	 of	 such	 a	 council	 at	 the	 European	 level.	 	 The	 European	
Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	 (EESC),	 composed	 of	 representatives	 from	 national	 socio-
occupational	 organisations	 (trade	 unions,	 employer	 organisations	 and	 professional	 associations),	
was	set	up	with	an	advisory	function	similar	to	that	of	the	European	Parliamentary	Assembly.	 	The	
creation	 of	 the	 EESC	 should	 be	 placed	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 sector-by-sector	 approach	 to	
European	 integration	 (Lodge	 and	 Herman	 1980:	 267).	 The	 ‘Monnet	method’	 (Featherstone	 1994:	
155;	Wallace	1996:	42)	was	based	on	 the	 involvement	of	key	economic	elites,	 including	organised	
labour,	in	each	of	the	particular	sectors		targeted	for	integration	on	the	theory	that	they	would	build	
transnational	coalitions	 in	support	of	European	policies	(Wallace	1993:	300).	 	The	first	Commission	










purposes	of	 the	discussion	 in	this	chapter,	however,	 it	 is	 important	to	keep	 in	mind	the	difference	
between	‘authoritarian	corporatism’	(through	which	authoritarian	regimes	were	linked	to	economic	
elites,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 fake	 trade	 unions	 were	 used	 to	 control	 labor)	 and	 ‘societal’	 and	
‘liberal’	corporatism	,	which		developed	later	(hence	‘neo-corporatism’)	and		 in	which	trade	unions	




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































European	 Commission	 and	 the	 European	 Parliament	 which	 replaces	 the	 CONECCS	 database	
discussed	earlier.52	Unlike	CONECCS,	which	only	listed	European	civil	society	organisations	as	part	of	
the	 effort	 to	 incentivize	 more	 representative	 organisations,	 the	 Transparency	 Register	 aims	 to	
include	 all	 types	 of	 lobbying	 actors,	 whether	 NGOs,	 think-tanks,	 academic	 institutions,	 in-house	
lobbyists	 or	 consultancies.	 	 Compared	 to	 CONECCS,	 it	 also	 records	more	 information	 on	 lobbying	




the	 Register	 promotes	 free	 competition	 among	 interest	 groups	 to	 influence	 policy-making	 by	
ensuring	 that	 the	 process	 is	 transparent	 and	 that	 the	 actors	 follow	minimum	 standards	 of	 ethical	
lobbying	 behaviour.	 	 Although	 the	 Register	 is	 not	 obligatory,	 estimates	 suggest	 that	 about	 three	
quarters	of	EU-level	 lobbying	actors	are	now	registered,	 thanks	to	a	system	of	persuasion,	naming	
and	 shaming,	 and	 carrots	 rather	 than	 sticks,	 such	 as	 an	 early-alert	 email	 system	 for	 new	





final;	 Communication	 European	 Transparency	 Initiative:	 A	 framework	 for	 relations	 with	 interest	
representatives	 (Register	 and	 Code	 of	 Conduct)	 COM(2008)323	 final;	 Agreement	 between	 the	
European	Parliament	and	the	European	Commission	on	the	establishment	of	a	transparency	register	




government	 decision	 making,	 as	 found	 in	 the	 pluralist	 American	 system	 of	 notice-and-comment	
rulemaking.		Moreover,	as	a	result	of	the	Transparency	Register,	the	Commission	and	the	European	
Parliament	now	have	at	their	disposal	considerably	more	information	on	lobbying	actors,	which	can	
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